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Abstract
Although biological species might seem paradigmatic natural objects, several objec-
tions can be advanced against their independence from taxonomic activities and from 
scientific and social practices in general. Darwin himself, in the second chapter of the 
Origin, claimed to be looking «at the term species as one arbitrarily given, for the sake of 
convenience, to a set of individuals closely resembling each other». In this contribution, 
I sketch the sticking points of the issue whether species are natural or social objects in 
the light of two of the main accounts of social objects, namely Searle’s, on the one hand, 
and Ferraris’ on the other. 
1. Natural vs. Social: a Sharp Distinction
Although different in their core, the theory of social reality put forward by 
Searle (1995; 2010) and that by Ferraris (2009; 2012) are in a substantial agree-
ment in drawing a sharp ontological distinction between natural objects and 
facts, on the one hand, and social or institutional objects and facts, on the other. 
Consider the following statement: “The conference ‘Social Ontology. From 
Intentionality to Documentality’ was held in March 2011 at the Institute for 
Philosophy and Social Theory in Belgrade”. The statement concerns a certain 
historical fact, and that fact makes it true or false – true, in this case. Nonetheless, 
that fact requires human institutions for its existence – things like conferences, 
cities, institutes, researchers, and so on – and thus it depends, ultimately, on 
human agreement. Now consider: “Your body is made of 16% proteins, 13% 
lipids, 1% glucids, 65% water, 5% mineral salts”. This statement too concerns 
1 I am grateful to Maurizio Ferraris, Giuliano Torrengo, and Achille Varzi for their precious 
comments and remarks on a previous version of this paper.
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an objective fact, which makes the statement true. But this fact does not require 
human institutions for its existence. In this case, human institutions – such as 
language and scientific theories – are only needed to state the fact. Trivially, with-
out language and scientific theories, a claim about the composition of human 
body could not be made; still, that very composition is completely independent 
of what human beings may think, know, and say about it. It only depends on 
physical and chemical objects involved.
In John Searle’s words:
In a sense there are things that exist only because we believe them to exist. I am 
thinking of things like money, property, governments, and marriages. Yet many facts 
regarding these things are “objective” facts […] as that I am a citizen of the United States, 
that the piece of paper in my pocket is a five dollar bill […] These contrast with such 
facts as that Mount Everest has snow and ices near the summit […] Years ago I baptized 
some of the facts dependent on human agreement as “institutional facts”, in contrast 
to nonistitutional, or “brute”, facts. Institutional facts […] require human institution 
for their existence […] Brute facts require no human institutions for their existence2. 
In a similar spirit, it has been claimed by Maurizio Ferraris that natural ob-
jects and social objects are two completely different types of objects altogether. 
Natural objects, such as mountains, rivers, human bodies, and animals, exist in 
space and time and are what they are independently of our beliefs, emotions, 
observations, and cognition of them. Social objects endure in time and exist in 
space, but – unlike natural objects – their physical presence is limited, accord-
ing to Ferraris’ theory, to the inscription being at their basis. And, contrary to 
natural objects, they depend on our subjective activities. After defining social 
reality as the sum of all social objects, and natural reality as the sum of all natural 
objects, Ferraris writes:
(a) […] natural objects exist independently of our conceptual schemes, while social 
objects require such schemes essentially; and (b) […] the schemes that are at work in 
the experience of social objects are different from those that apply to the science of 
natural objects. At this point, it is no longer possible to maintain that natural reality is 
constructed like scientists’ theories, as the postmodernists claim3. 
At first glance, the sharpness of the natural/social opposition is fairly intuitive 
and convincing: a stone is there, and it is what it is regardless of any represen-
tation we may have of it and of our presence, thoughts, and intentions. The 
Belgrade “Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory” is there, of course, but 
unlike the stone, without us it wouldn’t be an institute for philosophy and so-
cial theory but merely an aggregate of bricks and glass. Nonetheless, if we carry 
2 Searle 1995: 1-2.
3 Ferraris 2009: 120 eng. tr.
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the examples beyond the paradigmatic cases, it seems that some objects – and 
some facts involving those objects – challenge the sharpness of that opposition, 
asking for more fine-grained distinctions. In the following, I will focus on the 
case of biological species. 
Before getting to the heart of the matter, a preliminary remark is in order. 
Even though Searle and Ferraris agree in drawing a sharp distinction between 
the natural and the social realms, they strongly disagree on which are the 
mechanisms underlying and regulating social reality. This can easily be seen 
by looking at the two constitutive rules of social objects that are at the basis of 
their respective theories: X counts as Y in C (Searle) and Social Object = Inscribed 
Act (Ferraris). While for Searle social reality rests on collective intentionality 
imposing functions, for Ferraris it rather rests on inscriptions: «Social objects 
follow from the registration of acts that involve at least two persons and that are 
inscribed on any kind of physical support»4. A second, more radical difference, 
albeit less explicitly stated, concerns the background ontologies embraced by 
the two philosophers. According to Searle, the basic ontology is scientific, i.e., 
it is the ontology that emerges from the picture of the world as sketched by our 
best scientific theories. Accordingly, the basic ontology is mainly shaped by the 
acceptance of the results of two theories: the atomic theory of matter and the 
evolutionary theory of biology. The picture of reality offered by these two theories 
is, in a nutshell, the following: 
The world consists entirely of entities that we find it convenient, though not entirely 
accurate, to describe as particles. These particles exist in field of force, and are organized 
into systems. The boundaries of systems are set by causal relations. Examples of systems 
are mountains, planets, H2O molecules, rivers, crystals, and babies. Types of living systems 
evolve through natural selection, and some of them […] have evolved consciousness. 
With consciousness comes intentionality, the capacity of the organism to represent 
objects and states of affairs in the world to itself 5. 
Thus, the burning question underlying Searle’s work (1995 and 2010) is: 
«How can we account for the existence of social facts within that ontology?»6. 
Things are different in Ferraris’ Documentality. Here, scientific ontology and 
social ontology are reconciled in what Ferraris will call, in 2012, “New Realism”, 
where the «unemendability»7 of perceived reality dislocates scientific theories in 
4 Ibidem: 159.
5 Searle 1995: 6-7.
6 Ibidem: 7.
7 The expression has been coined by Ferraris in his book Il mondo esterno (2001), and it refers to 
the impermeability to conceptual schemes that would characterize ordinary experience. «While I 
am looking at a fire – Ferraris writes – I may think of it as a process of oxidation, as the action of 
phlogiston and caloric; but, under normal conditions, I cannot put my hand into it and not get 
burned» (Ferraris 2004: 123, fn. 7). 
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the field of epistemology contra the field of ontology (where epistemology and 
ontology are defined, respectively, as «the sphere of knowledge» and «the sphere 
of being»8. Put differently, perception results in ontology, while science results 
in epistemology: the outcomes of the first are unemendable while the outcomes 
of the second are always perfectible and can be rejected or replaced. For Ferraris, 
then, conflict arises not between two ontologies (scientific and social) but rather 
between epistemology and ontology9. The question here will be something like: 
“What if science and perception disagree? Which of the two should we believe?”. 
2. The Conundrum of Species
Paradigmatic examples of natural/brute objects and facts vs. social/institutional 
objects and facts are things like mountains, animals, and molecules vs. things 
like money, marriages, and governments, or facts involving the former things vs. 
facts involving the latter. I would like to argue that the some objects, such as 
taxonomic categories and the entities that they countenance, are not so easy 
to place on either side of the divide. In order to have an initial idea of why is 
it so, consider whales. As it is known, in the first edition of Linnaeus’ Systema 
naturae (1735), whales were classified as fish. In the tenth (1758), they “became” 
mammals. It is obvious that whales, those very organisms, did not undergo any 
change from 1735 to 1758. What changed was Linnaeus’ way of classifying 
them. Thus, on the one hand, it seems that we should say that families, genera, 
species, etc. are social objects, insofar as their characterization depends on our 
classificatory practices; but, on the other hand, it would seem odd to claim that 
mammal and fish are socially constructed categories. Even more odd would be 
to claim that our biology is founded on social objects. 
In what follows, I will focus on species, since it is with species, more than with 
other taxonomic categories, that the conundrum is particularly evident. Indeed, as 
with most social objects, and unlike natural ones, if someone asked you to point 
at the H. sapiens species, it is not clear what you should point at. Moreover, it can 
be argued that species boundaries are affected by a certain indeterminacy. It is for 
that reason that Darwin himself claimed to be looking «at the term species as one 
arbitrarily given, for the sake of convenience, to a set of individuals closely resem-
bling each other»10. Accordingly, the intuitive idea that species are natural objects is 
anything but unquestionable11. One of the main argument is that lines of descent 
exist in the four-dimensional continuum; to single out species on this continuous, 
we must chop it into discrete units in some arbitrary way12. Since everything is but 
8 Ferraris 2009: ch. 2.
9 See Ferraris 2010: 43 ff.
10 Darwin 1859: ch. 2.
11 See, for instance, Stamos 2003.
12 Burma 1949.
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a succession of conformations of individual particles of matter in time, the larger 
the aggregates we have to deal with become, the more our categories (which is to 
say the results of our grouping individual particles together) become abstract and 
devoid of real reference. Accordingly, for Burma, «Species and subspecies are the 
units with which the taxonomist deals, but they are merely convenient labels for 
arbitrary groupings and have only a minimum of biological meaning»13.
Nevertheless, at the same time species enjoy, at least in contemporary evolu-
tionary biology, a sort of ontological primacy over other entities such as genera or 
families. This is partially because in Gould and Eldredge’s model of punctuated 
equilibria (1972), «species boundaries become less arbitrary than in Darwin’s 
own view, and species eventually emerge with an individuality that turns them 
into potential units of selection»14. If we agree with the majority of contemporary 
biologists, evolution is a fact concerning species15 (mainly, if not only), and it is 
a fact independent of us. Borrowing Searle’s expression, we would be inclined 
to say that evolution is a brute fact. Species speciate and become extinct, shap-
ing the diversity of life on Earth; they are discovered, have causal power, can be 
counted, are countenanced in biological laws, have a starting point and an end. 
Accordingly, it is very tempting to consider species as objective features of the 
natural world, hence as natural objects. As Ernst Mayr puts it: 
The species is the principal unit of evolution […] The term “species” refers to a con-
crete phenomenon of nature and this fact severely constrains the number and kinds of 
possible definitions. The word “species” is, like the words “planet” or “moon”, a technical 
term for a concrete phenomenon16. 
However, Mayr continues, «the conclusion that there are concrete describable 
objects in nature which deserve to be called “species” is not unanimously accept-
ed. There has been a widespread view that species are only arbitrary artifacts of 
the human mind». As if to confirm this, while I am writing this article Google 
alerted me about the publication of a commentary by Zachos and Lovari in 
which it is argued that the Phylogenetic Species Concept17 «results in taxonomic 
13 Ibidem: 370.
14 Minelli 2013.
15 According to Darwin selection operated on individual organisms only – Darwin’s theory is 
a theory of microevolution (and this is probably enough to explain the popular fragment of the 
Origin reported above).
16 Mayr 1996: 262-263.
17 The Biological Species Concept – that was widely accepted in the aftermath of the Modern 
Synthesis and according to which species are reproductively isolated units – is becoming more 
and more replaced by the Phylogenetic Species Concept, which defines a species as the smallest 
diagnosable group of individual organisms tied by a parental pattern of ancestry and descent (see 
Cracraft 1983: 170). 
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artefacts because it is theoretically flawed»18. Now, even without entering into 
the controversial question of what is the best species concept (more than 20 
concepts are attested in the literature)19, it is clear that somehow, when species 
are talked about as an outcome or a result of a given concept, the ghost of social 
objects is beating on the door. 
Who is right? Are species social objects? In order to make some progress towards 
answering the question that drives this contribution, a first, crucial distinction 
is in order. “Species” can refer to two different things. On the one hand, it can 
refer to (1) a category. This can be understood as (1a) a rank in the taxonomic 
hierarchy, more precisely the rank above subspecies and below genus; or (1b) a 
class, namely the class whose members are all and only the species taxa. On the 
other hand, “species” can refer to (2) species taxa, namely groups of populations 
comprised of concrete individual organisms, such as Homo sapiens, Rosa gigantea, 
Felis catus. 
(1a) Taxonomic levels can be quite easily treated as abstract objects. To put 
in a Millian way, “species” is in this case an abstract name that stands for an 
attribute of a thing rather than for a thing:
A concrete name is a name which stands for a thing; an abstract name is a name 
which stands for an attribute of a thing. Thus, John, the sea, this table, are names of 
things. White, also, is a name of a thing, or rather of things. Whiteness, again, is the 
name of a quality or attribute of those things. Man is a name of many things; humanity 
is a name of an attribute of those things. Old is a name of things; old age is a name of 
one of their attributes20. 
In the present case, «the thing» are the taxa, and «the attribute» could be called 
the specieness, namely the attribute of belonging to a certain taxonomic rank. Of 
course, things become more complicated when we switch from a mere semantic 
statement of the issue to a more metaphysically engaging one, i.e., when we ask 
whether the attributes sort things into classes and, if so, what is the ontological 
status of those classes. 
(1b) A class, in itself, seems to belong to the realm of abstract objects, too. 
Accordingly, you can be a nominalist on abstract objects, rejecting them al-
together, or you can be a realist, thinking that they exist somewhere, out of 
time and space, in a causally inert fashion21. But this is a different matter than 
the one we want to address in asking whether species are social objects. When 
we say that mountains are natural objects, or that banks are social objects, we 
clearly have in mind mountains and banks as concrete particulars; we are not 
18 Zachos and Lovari 2013: 142.
19 Mayden 1997.
20 Mill 1900: 17.
21 This is, of course, a naïve characterization of what abstract objects are thought to be, but here 
can do the job. For a discussion, see Burgess and Rosen 1997: 13-25.
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concerned with the class of all mountains, the class of all banks, or with some 
kind of abstract object whatsoever. As a result, to properly address our question 
we need to leave the first way of understanding “species”, namely (1) as a cate-
gory – be it a taxonomic rank or a class – and shift our attention to the second 
way, namely (2) as species taxa.
3. From the Species Category to Species Taxa
To investigate the ontological status of species taxa, two different points must 
be made. First, we need to draw a clear distinction between folk and expert 
understanding of species taxa; second, we need to consider the metaphysical 
status of taxa. 
Beginning with the first point, it is widely known that species as conceived 
in our everyday life overlap only partially with those recognized by taxonomists, 
and their names, too, are quite different22. Scott Atran (1999) proved that “folk-
biological” species – which he named “generic species” – reflect characteristics of 
both species and genus taxa, probably because distinguishing between genus and 
species is not pertinent to the knowledge of the local environment or to practical 
purposes. Generic species sometimes correspond to scientific genera (for instance, 
oak), sometimes – usually in the case of the most phenomenally salient and well-
known organisms –  to species (for instance, cat). Sometimes, as Atran states, 
folkbiological species correspond to fragments of biological families (vulture) or 
orders (bat). It should be noticed that generic species cannot easily be dismissed as 
mere mistakes or deviations from scientific species. They are quite stable and shared 
objects: ethnobiological evidence proves that human societies everywhere share 
similar folkbiological structures, and these cross-cultural invariants suggest that 
folkbiological taxonomy is a taxonomy with full rights, quite coherent, and struc-
tured around a small number of universal organizing principles23. 
As noticed by Dupré (1981), the extensions of folkbiological species taxa are 
quite dependent on our needs and interests. In folk taxonomy, a certain group of 
organisms can be classified as a species – the ontological privileged level – because 
they are economically or culturally important (silkworms, sheep, oaks) or maybe 
because they are nice and furry (Koala bears, rabbits), or again because they are 
very noticeable (tigers, elephants). And this list «could no doubt be extended 
almost indefinitely, which merely reflects the immense variety of human inter-
ests»24. Folk taxonomy often responds to our everyday needs in a more effective 
way than scientific taxonomy: it would be a severe culinary misfortune – says 
again Dupré – if a gourmet would not put more emphasis on the distinction 
between garlic and onions than the expert taxonomist. 
22 Dupré 1981.
23 Atran 1990; Berlin 1992.
24 Dupré 1981: 80.
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Back to our question, because of their dependence on our needs and interests, 
it would seem quite reasonable to classify generic species as social objects. If we 
weren’t there, some generic species would not exist, or would be quite different 
from what we think they are. If so, recalling the respective questions underlying 
Searle’s and Ferraris’ different ontologies, in one case we should deal with the 
question: “How can we account for the existence of generic species within an 
evolutionary-based ontology?”; in the other, with the question: “What if folk 
and expert taxonomy disagree? Who would be right?”.
Starting with the second question, in some cases generic species and scien-
tific species correspond, as with cats (F. catus) or human beings (H. sapiens). 
Regarding those cases in which they do not correspond, a pluralistic view about 
species taxa could do the job. To be sure, pluralism on species taxa comes with a 
high price to pay, namely the questioning of the reality of species. Nevertheless, 
several attempts have been made to avoid paying such a price25. As for Searle’s 
first question – how to account for the existence of generic species within an 
evolutionary-based ontology – a possible answer is that, while taxonomists try 
to reconstruct the evolution of species and to reflect it in biological taxonomies, 
generic species seem to belong more to our own evolution, and this should 
be enough to reconcile them with an evolutionary-based ontology. In fact, it 
seems plausible to think that the universal and spontaneous understanding of 
the organic world at the basis of folk taxonomies is «an evolutionary adaptation 
[…] to relevant and recurrent features of hominid ancestral environments (e.g., 
wide-ranging subsistence involving the understanding of potentially indefinitely 
many species and habitats)»26. 
Consider now species taxa as they are recognized by expert taxonomists. While 
in the case of generic species it seems reasonable to suppose that such groups 
are, to a great extent, the product of our own perceptual system and pragmatic 
interests, the aim of scientific taxonomies is to mirror the structure of natural 
world, with no reference whatsoever to our interests or cognitive activities (even 
though, of course, taxonomists are human beings and their activity is constrained 
and conditioned by their own cognitive limits and biases)27. Are taxa as recognized 
by experts natural objects? 
This question takes us to the second point mentioned at the beginning of 
this section, namely, what sort of entities are species taxa, in the understanding 
of taxonomists? Traditionally, species taxa are considered to be sets or classes of 
organisms: H. sapiens is the set or class made up of all human beings. If so, then 
the answer is almost trivial, as in (1b) considered above: species taxa are neither 
social nor natural objects; rather, they are abstract entities whose members are 
25 Kitcher (1984) and Ereshefsky (1992) apply pluralism to scientific species only; while Dupré 
(1993) takes into account folkbiological species too.
26 Atran 1999.
27 See, for instance, Hey 2001.
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concrete organisms. By contrast, an increasingly popular view sees species taxa 
as particular, individual things28. Intuitively, they are “large” individual wholes 
that are literally composed of concrete individual organisms, in the same way in 
which an individual organism is composed of its own cells. Thus, for example, 
on this view a human being is literally a part of the taxon Homo sapiens, not 
a member of it. Understood in this way, species taxa possess a history of their 
own along with peculiar features that do not depend in any way on us. They 
are spatiotemporal entities, just like the individual organisms they consist of 
(and like stones, mountains, etc.); they have a beginning and an end; they can 
make more of themselves (by speciating); and so on. They are, in short, “super 
organisms” of some sort, provided with their own identity and survival condi-
tions and – according to some (e.g. Johnson 1992) – with interests in their own 
right. Understood in this way, it seems reasonable to think of species taxa as of 
natural objects, at least to the extent that we are inclined to think of a human 
being, a stone or a mountain as a natural object – a claim that both Searle and 
Ferraris would be willing to make.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this contribution some lines for a possible enquiry on the ontological 
status of species have been suggested. Starting with a comparison between two 
of the main theories on social objects, the question whether species are social or 
natural objects has been raised. It has been argued that answering that question 
would require a fine-grained analysis of what species are. In particular, species 
as a category and species as taxa have been distinguished. In the first case, it has 
been suggested that both ways of understandings species as a category (namely, 
as a taxonomic level or as a class) are likely to yield an answer to the effect that 
species are neither social nor natural objects, but rather abstract entities. In the 
second case, two different notions of species taxa – folkbiological and scientif-
ic – have been considered. It has been argued that, while the former can plausibly 
be construed as social objects, the latter are rather natural (or, better, biological) 
objects as long as they are also considered as individuals.
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